Our paper shows that financing relationships between borrower and investor (bank) arise even without hidden information-namely, based on implicit contracts. We show that bank relationships are especially inflexible when the borrower needs to extend the number of creditors. Due to their relationship, banks are able to conclude tacit agreements with a borrower. Any potential outside investor must hence fear collusion between bank and borrower-at his own expense. In our paper, banks can use their power on the entrepreneur to press him towards inefficiently safe projects (inverse asset substitution).
Introduction
Relationship banking has many bright sides. For example, due to their long-term relationship, banks and entrepreneurs can conclude implicit contracts. These can be based upon information that is not explicitly contractible. Allegedly, relationship banking also has two dark sides (see Boot (2000) ). First, because of the soft budget constraint problem, a relationship lender cannot commit to not granting additional loans, should problems arise. Second, the relationship lender obtains an information monopoly over the entrepreneur, this may lead to a hold-up problem. In this paper, we demonstrate that bank relationships entail a third cost. Assume that additional finance from a third party (an outsider) is necessary. Then, due to the bank's ability to conclude implicit contracts, the outsider needs to fear collusion between the bank and the entrepreneur. In this case the outsider will not be willing to finance even a project with a positive net present value.
In our paper, we discuss collusion in the context of asset substitution. Because of his convex profit function, the borrower-entrepreneur has an incentive to carry out overly risky projects. We show that a long-term bank relationship between borrower and investor can help to overcome this agency problem. Borrower and investor conclude an implicit contract to take the efficient version of the project, otherwise the relationship breaks down. However, the ability to conclude implicit contracts with the relationship lender comes with a downside. Third parties (for example, potential outside investors) must fear that borrower and relationship lender collude against them. As a consequence, outsiders may keep away in the first place.
Hence, the upside of the relationship, the ability to conclude implicit contracts, is fundamentally connected to the downside, the ability to collude against third parties.
How could such a collusion work? With multiple investors, insider and outsider, the interests of investors differ due to differences in seniority. Typically, the most senior investor has the greatest interest in safe investment projects. As a consequence, senior creditors have an incentive to collude with the borrower and push him towards overly safe project choices. Hence, the coalition between insider/senior investor and borrower may have a tendency towards excessive safety (inverse asset substitution). This is possible only at the expense of the outside investor. Thus, agency problems between investors and borrower are much more complex than in the case of just a single investor.
How can the borrower benefit from choosing an overly safe project, even though he has a concave profit function and hence no intrinsic interest in safety? The reasoning goes as follows. The insider can reward the borrower for prudent investment with low lending rates. If the insider detects the borrower taking a risky project, he punishes the borrower by charging higher loan rates in the future. Hence low lending rates serve as a kind of "side payment" to the borrower. This tacit agreement between insider and borrower is sub-game perfect only if the two have a long-term relationship: the borrower agrees to choose safe projects, whereas the insider agrees to grant favorable low lending rates. If safe projects are inefficient, this tacit agreement comes at the cost of the (junior) outside investor. As a consequence, the junior investor may choose not to invest in the first place. Because the borrower cannot commit not to have tacit agreements with the bank, this may result in underinvestment.
Note that the problem of inverse asset substitution only occurs when there are several heterogeneous creditors. If there was only one creditor, or if the creditors' claims had the same priority, we would be back in the standard asset substitution situation. However, in reality, we can hardly observe firms with only one creditor or with claims of equal priority. There is a host of literature that provides theoretical arguments for this finding. Ongena and Smith (2000) and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) analyze the number of bank relationships. Biais and Gollier (1997) , Petersen and Rajan (1997), and Wilner (2000) address why a firm should have bank and trade credit simultaneously, showing that a seniority structure can be beneficial when there is entrepreneurial moral hazard. However, this literature does not reveal any costs associated with a seniority structure.
Literature. The paper contributes to the literature (see, e. g., Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) , Foglia, Laviola, and Marullo Reedtz (1998) , D'Auria, Foglia, and Marullo Reedtz (1999) ) in several ways. Most importantly, we show that inverse asset substitution can emerge as a special kind of moral hazard, if there are multiple lenders, and if collusion is possible. Up to now, the literature has mostly looked at a lender's incentives to take excessive risk (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Bester and Hellwig (1987) ). Furthermore, Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) , Hart and Moore (1995) and Longhofer and Santos (2000) interpret seniority as a solution to financing problems. Our paper looks at costs that are generated by a seniority ordering.
Our analysis differs substantially from that of Myers (1977) . In Myers' model, profitable safe investments (extensions) are not undertaken because it is mainly the creditor who would profit from the benefits, not the entrepreneur. In our model, unprofitable safe decisions are anticipated to be taken because the bank abuses its relationship with the entrepreneur, pressuring him into excessive caution. As a consequence, profitable risky projects are not undertaken. Myers analyzes the problem of underinvestment in a setting where there are homogeneous creditors, but does not consider collusion between parties. We emphasize the benefits and costs of a relationship bank's ability to have tacit agreements with a firm.
Our model also sheds new light on the literature of relationship lending. The existing literature, such as Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) , Boot and Thakor (2000) , and Degryse and Ongena (2001, 2005) , mainly looks at the relationship between the bank and its debtor, but not at the negative external effects on third parties. A strong relationship and collusion can deter outside creditors from providing credit.
Especially in times of technological innovation, when the most profitable investments necessarily comprise some risk, an existing bank relationship may actively hinder firm growth. As a consequence, the possible negative external effects of relationship banking may have negative macroeconomic effects in economies with a bank-dominated financial system. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After introducing our model in Section 2, we derive sequential equilibria in Section 3. In Section 2.2, we first look at the case where projects are never extended and show that tacit agreements mitigate the classical asset substitution problem. In Section 3.3, we consider project extensions, and we show that a tacit agreement between the entrepreneur and the senior creditor can lead to inefficiently safe projects (inverse asset substitution). Section 4 concludes.
The Value of Implicit Contracts

Model Structure
Consider an economy with an infinite time horizon, t = 0, . . . , ∞. There are two types of agents, a borrower and an investor. Both are risk neutral, rational, and exhibit no time preference. Project returns cannot be transferred into the next period. The borrower holds all bargaining power. Only debt-finance is possible. Note that, due to the infinite time horizon, borrower and investor can conclude implicit contracts.
The Borrower. In each period, the borrower can invest J into a project. He can choose between three versions, safe (s), medium (m) and risky (r). The project yields a return of R ∈ {R s , R m , R r } with probability p ∈ {p s , p m , p r }, depending on the version. Otherwise, the return is zero. If successful, a riskier version yields a higher return, R r > R m > R s and p s > p m > p r . As opposed to both safe and risky version, the medium version has a positive NPV, p m R m > p r R r > J > p s R s ; it is socially optimal to take some risk, but not too much. Potentially, the borrower can be excessively careful (version s) or excessively daring (version r).
Information and Timing. The version choice of the project is observable, but not verifiable by courts. The time structure of one single period is summarized in Figure 1 . After one period, independent from choice and success of the former project version, the model starts anew with probability w. Hence after each period, with probability 1 − w, the borrower's flow of new investment ideas runs dry for good. • The borrower applies for a loan, proposing a repayment R i to the investor.
• The investor decides whether to grant the loan. Investment.
• The borrower chooses the version of the project, safe (s), medium (m), or risky (r).
• The project matures. If possible, the borrower pays his debt.
Equilibrium Analysis
Arm's Length Finance. We first discuss the equilibrium in the absence of implicit contracts. In this case, project version decisions of the borrower do not influence future financing conditions-we are left with a standard one-period moral hazard problem. Given the nominal repayment R i to the i nvestor, the borrower chooses the medium version iff
The excessively safe version is never chosen. With the medium version, the investor's participation constraint is p m R m ≥ J. Because the borrower holds all bargaining power, p m R m = J in equilibrium. Substituting into (1), the the project is financed and the efficient medium version is chosen if
If (2) holds, the entrepreneur receives the complete NPV of p m R m − J each period. Otherwise, the risky version will be chosen, and the borrower receives only the NPV of p r R r − J each period. Hence the "loss" to the borrower is p m R m − p r R r per period.
Relationship Lending. Consider now the case that (2) does not hold. Assume that borrower and investor conclude an implicit contract, hence they establish a relationship. For example, the investor may play the standard grim trigger strategy: he supposes that the borrower always chooses the version that is in the common interests of both, the medium version. In return, the investor grants the loan at favorable interest rates. Once deceived, the investor switches to arm's length finance: He now supposes asset substitution (the risky version) and consequently demands a higher interest rate from then on. 2 This threat disciplines the borrower in his project choice. Given the nominal repayment R i to the investor, he now chooses the efficient medium project if
Again, the excessively safe version is never chosen. The investor's binding participation constraint yields p m R m = J, hence the project is financed and the medium version is chosen iff
The entrepreneur then receives the complete NPV of p m R m − J each period. If (4) fails to hold, the excessively risky version is chosen, and the NPV drops to p r R r − J each period. We sum up our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Implicit Contracts in Relationship Lending) The ability to conclude implicit contracts increases the expected return to the borrower iff
In this interval, the value of the ability to conclude implicit contracts equals the difference in NPV, p m R m − p r R r per period and (p m R m − p r R r )/(1 − w) in the aggregate. The proposition illustrates the bright side of relationship banking, corresponding to Boot (2000, section 3, first item). Intrinsically, due to his convex profit function, the borrower prefers the excessively risky version of the project. The investor's preference for safety and its ability to use implicit contracts to exert pressure induce the borrower to choose the efficient medium version. In the following, we concentrate on the case where Proposition 1 applies, i. e., implicit contracts between investor and the borrower are beneficial.
Note that the model works completely without hidden information. The type of the borrower is exactly known ex ante. As a consequence, there is no Bayesian learning over time. Models of relationship lending based on hidden information typically conclude that the role of relationships decreases as markets become more transparent. Our model postulates that even if markets are perfectly transparent, there can be a role for relationships. Furthermore, in traditional models of relationship lending, borrowers find it hard to turn to outside investors due to a lemons problem. If the borrower turns to outside lenders, the outsiders interpret this as a signal that the relationship lender has received adverse information and has therefore refused an extension of finance. In the following section, we will show that a comparable problem occurs also under perfect transparency: Outsiders must fear that borrower and relationship lender collude against him.
3 Implicit Contracts and Collusion
Model Structure
Consider the following modification of the basic model. Within each period, after the investment, a deepening investment turns up with probability q > 0. For notational ease and comparability, this extension is assumed to scale up the original project by a factor 2. Hence, the extension requires the investment of another J, the return is then 2 R ∈ {2 R s , 2 R m , 2 R r } with probabilities p ∈ {p s , p m , p r }, respectively. After investing into the extension, the borrower can (re)decide on the version (safe, medium, or risky). Without the extension, the original project still works and yields the original R ∈ {R s , R m , R r }.
Two Investors. To make the problem interesting, assume that the original investor only has resources of J per period. As a consequence, in order to finance the extension, the borrower must turn to another investor. This investor only provides one-time liquidity, he cannot conclude implicit contracts with the borrower. We call the investor who can conclude implicit contracts the insider, the investor who cannot conclude implicit contracts is called the outsider. For example, one could interpret the outsider as a supplier who disappears after one period. We use indices i and o for i nsider and outsider.
Seniority. As before, finance is granted in the form of standard debt contracts. Assume that contracts come with a seniority clause: The investor who finances the basic project ends up in a senior position, whereas the financier of the extension gets a junior claim; seniority cannot be swapped (cf. Smith and Warner (1979) for empirical evidence). The time structure of a single period of the extended game is given in Figure 2 . We have implicitly assumed that the borrower takes the first loan for the basic project from the insider, and the (potential) second loan for the extension from the outsider. The logic of the model would also allow for the inverse ordering. However, in this case, the basic project would not be financed in the first place because the outsider cannot use implicit contracts to push the entrepreneur towards the efficient medium version.
The insider can conclude implicit contracts with the borrower, but the outsider cannot. As a consequence, insider and borrower can use implicit contracts to form a coalition and tacitly collude against the outsider. We will find that the insider can use his implicit power over the borrower to make him choose the inefficiently safe version of the project, to the disapproval of the junior outsider. Although the borrower himself is risk-loving due to his limited liability, he may opt for inefficient safety (inverse asset substitution). For exposition, we now illustrate the phenomenon in a one-period setting. • The borrower applies for a loan from the insider, proposing a repayment R i .
• The investor decides whether to grant the loan.
• With probability q, a deepening investment opportunity turns up.
The borrower then applies for a loan from the outsider, proposing a repayment R o .
• The borrower chooses the version of the (basic or extended) project, safe (s), medium (m), or risky (r).
• The project matures. If possible, the borrower repays his debts.
Parenthesis: The Idea of Inverse Asset Substitution
Partition of Project Returns. Because the lending capacity of each investor is restricted to J, the borrower needs to lend from two different investors to finance both the basic project and the extension. Due to the temporal structure, a hierarchy of creditors results-the creditor that finances the extension ends up in the junior position. If 2 R denotes the uncertain return of the extension, R 1 and R 2 denote the nominal values of the senior and junior creditors' claims, then each agent's yields are R sen. = min{R 1 ; 2 R}, R jun. = min{R 2 ; max{0; 2 R − R 1 }}, R bor. = max{0; 2 R − R 1 − R 2 }.
In Figure 3 , the senior claim on the project return is shaded in medium gray, the junior claim is shaded in light gray, the borrower's residual claim is shaded in dark gray. If there is a coalition between the borrower and the senior creditor, then their joint claim is framed by the bold curve in the right picture. This curve has (weakly) concave as well as (weakly) convex regions. As a consequence, the coalition may be biased towards excessively risky as well as excessively safe choices.
Project Choice.
Assume for the moment that the borrower is already in a situation where he has invested into the extension. The insider holds a senior debt claim of face value R i , and the outsider holds a junior debt claim of face value R o . Now the borrower must choose between the safe, medium, and risky version of the extension. For the moment, let us also assume that 2 R m ≥ R i +R o ≥ 2 R s ≥ R i : the returns from the medium project suffice to repay all the debt in case of success; the returns from the safe project suffice only to repay the senior debt to the insider-the outsider is repaid only partially. Let us compare the safe with the medium version. Under the safe version, the insider receives an expected return of U i = p s R i , the outsider receives U o = p s (2 R s − R i ), the borrower gets nothing. Under the medium version, the insider receives an expected return of
The insider and the outsider individually prefer the safe version; the borrower prefers the medium one. However, a coalition between borrower and insider may result in a preference for the safe version: the coalition receives U i +U bor. = p m (2 R m −R o ) with the medium version, and U i +U bor. = R i with the safe version. The coalition has thus an incentive for inverse asset substitution (to choose the safe version although it is inefficient) iff Hence, the borrower himself would have a preference towards the excessively risky version. However, the coalition of borrower and insider together expect a return of p s R i = 1.666 from the safe version, p m (2 R m − R o ) = 1.56 from the medium version, and p r (2 R r − R o ) = 1.6 from the risky version. Hence the coalition prefers the excessively safe version, the only version with a negative NPV.
Consequently, the coalition can benefit from being excessively cautious. Other things being equal, this case is more likely to occur, the bigger the outsider's junior claim (R o ) and the lower the probability of the success of the risky version (p r ). Yet, it is not immediately clear that collusion between the insider and the borrower can be sub-game perfect. Especially, the insider must be willing to make sufficient concessions to the borrower so that he also benefits from the coalition, e. g. in the form of low interest rates. The coalition must be sufficiently valuable for the borrower to choose the safe extension, although he intrinsically prefers the risky version. Therefore, we now come to the analysis of the complete model, treating the claims R i and R o as endogenous variables.
Equilibrium Analysis
Arm's Length Finance. If the borrower chooses arm's length finance, there is no insider, hence no tacit collusion against an outsider can occur. The possibility to conclude implicit contracts is only interesting if (2) fails to hold. As a consequence, because the extended project equals the basic project times a factor 2, the borrower will choose the risky version. Because the probability of an extension is q in each period, the discounted aggregate expected NPV equals (1 + q) (p r R r − J)/(1 − w).
Relationship Lending. Now let us consider the case that the borrower builds up a relationship with the insider in order to commit to opting for the efficient, medium version (at least, as long as there is not project extension). The insider finances the basic project, whereas the outsider finances the extension; as a result, the insider ends up in the senior position. A tacit coalition between the borrower and the insider is necessary since it solves the moral hazard problem (asset substitution) regarding the basic project. If the project is extended and the coalition forms, it holds a portfolio of junior and senior position (the area under the thick curve in Figure 3 ). The coalition's tacit agreement demands that the borrower always acts in the common interest of the coalition; otherwise it collapses (grim trigger). For the moment, assume that the grim trigger strategy is sufficiently grim to make the borrower behave in the interest of the coalition. In Section 3.2, we have seen that in the presence of a third party (the outsider), the coalition can lead to an inefficient project choice-to the detriment of the borrower. Crucially, the borrower cannot commit to not concluding any value-decreasing agreements. We will make this argument more precise in the following.
Consider an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the outsider provides finance with probability γ, and borrower and insider have an agreement that the borrower opts for the safe extension with probability β. The variable β could have the following meaning. At the beginning of the period, when the borrower proposes the condition of the insider's loan R i , he also (orally, implicitly) proposes a β, which the insider can accept or reject.
The claims R i and R o by insider and outsider will be influenced by both variables β and γ. In equilibrium, the borrower's choice of β must be optimal for given γ, R o and R i . The outsider's choice of γ must be optimal for a given β (which can only be anticipated by the outsider). Finally, R i and R o must be sufficiently high to satisfy the participation constraints of both investors.
If there is no extension (probability 1−q), the insider receives R i with probability p m . If an extension is possible, but the outsider does not provide finance, the probability is again the p m of the basic project. If the extension is financed, the borrower opts for the safe version with probability β; in this case the success probability rises to p s , otherwise it remains at p m . Consequently, the insider's participation constraint is
The outsider has slightly different considerations. If he provides finance, this already means that the extension is possible. Consequently, his participation constraint is
whereβ is the outsider's expectation concerning the variable β of the implicit contract. In equilibrium, both participation constraints (5) and (6) will be binding. Let us now analyze the borrower's decision on β. If he chooses the safe extension, his expected return is zero for this period; the safe return is not even sufficient to satisfy the outsider's claims. If he chooses the medium extension, his expected return is
. Finally, with probability 1 − q γ, there is no extension at all, the borrower takes the medium basic project and expects a return of q m (R m − R i ). Summing up, the expected profit is
When choosing his strategy, the borrower takes into account that by proposing a higher β, he increases the probability that the insider is repaid, hence according to (5) he can set a lower R i in compensation. However, the actual choice of β does not influence R o , because the outsider cannot observe β. Hence formally, one must substitute (5) into (7), then take the derivative with respect to β in order to get the first order condition, and finally substitute (6). For an inner solution of β, the outsider is indifferent between participating and not; hence one can set γ to one. Then
Solving for β yields an inner solution β < 1 for
For q <q, one receives a corner solution β = 1. In this case, the participation constraint of the outside investor does not hold, hence the outsider chooses never to participate, γ = 0. Note that, interestingly, the outsider cannot be persuaded to participate by offering him a higher R o : Because β = 1, the safe version is chosen, so the outsider receives only 2 R s − R i , independent of the promised amount R o . We have derived the following result.
Proposition 2 (Credit Rationing due to Tacit Collusion) For q <q, hence if the probability of an extension is small enough, the potentially profitable extension is not financed because outsiders are repelled by tacit collusion between borrower and insider.
Now if q <q, no extension will be financed if the borrower opts for relationship financing. The alternative, opting for arm's length finance, has the disadvantage that the inefficient risky version is chosen for both the basic project and the potential extension. The borrower's choice depends (e. g.) on the variable R r . The higher R r , the more efficient is the risky version, the less does the borrower suffer from not opting for the relationship. By comparing expected profits in both cases, one finds that the critical R r is
This yields the following result. In our numerical example,q ≈ 0.05 andR r ≈ 2.15. Because in the example, R r is fixed at 2.1, the borrower never prefers arm's length finance over the relationship, even though the relationship becomes "too close" if the project extension turns up. Figure 5 .
In traditional models of relationship finance, outsiders fear to lend to the borrower because they anticipate that the original insider does not extend finance due to adverse information. In our setting, an outsider recoils from providing finance even if he does know the reason why the borrower gets no more credit from the insider (e. g., because the insider has no more money himself). A fortiori, the outsider would not provide finance if he did not know the reason for the borrower to turn to an outsider, anticipating that potentially the insider uses his implicit power over the borrower to make him seek outside finance, and then choose inefficiently safe version of the project. The thick curve gives expected profits for a borrower that uses a relationship to finance the basic project. The dotted curve gives the profits for arm's length finance.
Conclusion
Our model provides two main results. First, relationship banking has both a bright and a dark side. It may mitigate entrepreneurial moral hazard, but it may also facilitate collusion at the expense of outside creditors. Second, asset substitution problems can entail problems, shifting risk towards excessive risk, but also inversely substituting assets towards excessive caution.
A long-term creditor (bank, insider) can solve asset substitution problems with an entrepreneur by using tacit agreements: the entrepreneur agrees to choose safe projects, whereas the insider agrees to grant low interest rates. Such a tacit agreement is beneficial because it prevents the borrower from choosing overly risky projects versions. However, tacit agreements may induce a cost if additional (junior) outside investors are involved to finance follow-up projects or extensions. Now the insider pushes the entrepreneur towards inefficient prudence. As a consequence, project extensions cannot be financed. The agreement between an entrepreneur and an insider leads to a lock-in effect: The entrepreneur's funds are limited by the insider's financing capacity. No additional creditor dares to finance an extension facing the possible coalition of entrepreneur and insider. Credit is rationed-not because of anticipated excessive risk-taking, but because of anticipated excessive risk avoidance.
